As of writing this, Mexicans are still digesting Claudia Sheinbaum’s resounding victory in the presidential elections of June 2. There are plenty of journalistic columns and reports trying to explain the cultural, political, and social phenomenon that led her to become the first woman president in our history, with a truly overwhelming mandate at the polls. The challenges Claudia will face are, like her victory, enormous; and will require a blend of political ingenuity and pragmatism never seen before.
Domestically, the advance of organized crime – and especially common crime, which affects ordinary Mexicans the most – is extremely concerning. To contain this advance and lay the foundations for a reasonably functional public security system, the new president will need three things: political determination, strategy, and resources. It won’t be enough to follow the model of the last six years – or perhaps the last 18 – which has proven time and again to be utterly ineffective. Security encompasses both objective (tangible) and subjective (perceptions) aspects. The former requires clear, decisive actions; the latter, a deep communicative effort to explain the citizens the magnitude of the challenge, the budgetary and material requirements, and above all, the time it will take to achieve the goals (I assume no less than two decades).
To reverse the trend in violence, a profound national police reform will be necessary, placing local police forces at the center (mainly through the professionalization and standardization of state police forces, and perhaps the dissolution of municipal police forces). The likelihood of the National Guard being fully integrated into SEDENA is high, aiming to consolidate an intermediate police force focused on stabilization operations and territorial control (emphasizing highways and rural and peri-urban areas). However, this would overlook the urgent need for a 100% civilian national police force, primarily focused on urban areas, operating with technology and criminal intelligence to support state police agencies – and the states prosecutors’ offices, which also deserve extensive reform. I don’t know if the current President-elect’s team has something like this in mind, but this is the public and internal security model suggested by experts on the subject.
In terms of international security, the challenges are equally enormous. On one hand, the persistence of evolving criminal phenomena leaves no room for improvisation. The consolidation of transnational organized crime networks demands much greater participation from Mexico in global cooperation schemes. On the other hand, the geostrategic confrontation between the United States and China has led us into a new Cold War. While Beijing seeks a new global arrangement consistent with its economic and military might, Washington seems to be awakening from the strategic lethargy since the Peace Dividend of the 90s.
In late May and early June, during the Shangri-La Dialogue in Singapore (sponsored by the International Institute for Strategic Studies), the defense ministers of the United States and China offered completely divergent views on international security. While Defense Secretary Austin indirectly identified China as a destabilizing actor in the region, justifying the formation of alliances among democratic and free nations of the Indo-Pacific, his Chinese counterpart (an admiral, by the way) warned that if provocations by actors external to eminently Asian affairs continued, the military option was not off the table.
China’s economic rise, relatively subtle since Deng Xiaoping’s reforms in the late 1970s, has been followed by a frankly impressive growth in its military power over the past 20 years. Just read the Pentagon reports to the American Congress to be sure that if China’s current military capabilities catch our attention, the 15-year scenario is worrisome. Realists know very well that containing the Soviet Union within its vital geographic space is not the same as containing China, whose economy is already the second-largest in the world (the first, in terms of purchasing power parity).
What will Mexico’s policy towards China look like? Will there be a way to navigate the confrontation between Beijing and Washington in the coming years, prioritizing our national interest? How will Mexico take advantage of the relocation of value chains, which depends largely on Chinese investments, under the watchful eye of the United States?
The upcoming renegotiation of the USMCA will offer the first answers, so Mexico needs to come with a well-defined strategy – and one that is agreed upon with various national political and economic actors, or else we will appear deeply vulnerable.
Trust me, we don’t want to arrive at Trump’s table without a strategy.
I believe Claudia’s mandate opens the opportunity to rethink how Mexico will face its internal and external security challenges in the coming decades. Perhaps it is time to reconsider a profound reform of our entire National Security apparatus, setting aside short-term political calculations and proposing doctrines, policies, and strategies for the Mexico of the future.
I’m not sure if Claudia’s team – and Claudia herself – understand both the magnitude of the challenge and the enormous opportunity they have, but I hope they do.
For the sake of Mexico, but specially for the Mexicans still to come.
Photo credit: 1zoom.me/es/
Defensa - Estrategia - Geopolítica 