On January 5, 2024, the Brazilian Navy assumed command of Combined Task Force 151, based in Bahrain. A few days before, the Colombian Navy had announced its was joining such force which, together with four other task forces with similar functions, is part of the Combined Maritime Forces (CMF), a naval organization that integrates no less than 40 countries. .
CTF 151, founded in 2009 following the United Nations Security Council resolutions regarding the situation off the coast of Somalia – particularly Resolution 1816, has as its main operational task the fight against piracy in the Gulf of Aden, in coordination with EUNAVFOR – the European Union naval task force in the area – and other nations whose fleets carry out Maritime Security operations in the region, among which China stands out.
The participation of South American nations such as Brazil, Colombia and Ecuador is to be applauded, as it demonstrates the commitment of these countries – and their political and naval leadership – to protect the international Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs), through which more than 80% of the world trade transits. This type of experiences not only communicates to the world a cooperative and responsible role in terms of international security, but also offers participating nations the opportunity to increase capabilities for the benefit of their own defense: they are practical laboratories to test operational concepts, exchange experiences and, in some cases, forge defense alliances.
In this sense, China’s experience in the area is worth highlighting. When various nations began sending ships for Maritime Security Operations off Somalia in late 2008 and early 2009, Beijing saw the opportunity to participate with a small fleet under the initial operational concept of “protect and safeguard Chinese merchant ships and their personnel in the region.” As the months passed, the People’s Liberation Army – Navy (PLAN, as the navy of that country is best known in the West) also began to escort ships under the UN World Food Program in transit through the area.
The naval gradualness in the Chinese vision allowed that country to gain tactical and operational experience, which forced Beijing to coordinate with the rest of the nations that had sent ships to the region, yet maintaining operational command of its own fleet. In fact, and under the auspices of the US Fifth Fleet, China joined the SHADE (Shared Awareness and Deconfliction) agreement, in order to share a common communication code that would make international operations off Somalia more efficient.
Initially, the Chinese task force had some logistical problems that even called into question the future of its entire counter piracy mission. In late 2009, it emerged that the crew of two Chinese destroyers never had the opportunity to disembark and take some time off, which severely affected morale within for the remainder of the mission. Instead of sending these ships for a port call and acquire fresh food supplies, they were left “on station” for several months. However, Beijing learned its lesson and subsequent missions had a more adequate operational tempo and regular port calls became normal. Yet China went even further, building in Djibouti its largest naval base outside the homeland.
But it is not the intention of this text to recount the evolution of Chinese naval capabilities, but rather to demonstrate that active participation in multinational operations offers good dividends to countries, both in their position as responsible international actors, and in the gradual -but constant- increase of its intrinsic defense capabilities. In the words of the then Chinese commander of the anti-piracy flotilla, Admiral Wu Shengli, “escort operations in the open sea are actually combat training operations, as they allow our navy to test its real capabilities to execute missions and tasks.”
When discussing the recent announcement of Colombia to take part in the Combined Maritime Force, as well as the reception of command by the Brazilian Navy of Task Force 151, there is nothing left but to applaud the political and naval leadership of said countries.
It is also inevitable to think about the strategic situation in which our beloved Mexican Navy finds itself, oriented to tasks well beyond its Constitutional nature, to the detriment of its already-limited defense capabilities.
Should Mexico take the example of Colombia and Brazil and rethink its naval strategic priorities?
I belive so.
Photo credits: http://www.news.navy.mil/view_single.asp?id=69015
Defensa - Estrategia - Geopolítica 